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I. INTRODUCTION
"Right now, the U.S. finds itself in a difficult position. Some of our
financial institutions have made mistakes and need capital .... So
they raise capital from where it exists, and sovereign wealth funds are
the most available form of capital right now... [But, b]ecause they
are government-owned, noneconomic factors may influence their
59
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decision-making and the pressure they put on companies that they
own a piece of."'
The Sovereign Wealth Fund ("SWF") dilemma has spurred
Congressional hearings,2 political speeches,' and Congressional Research
Service ("CRS") reports. The United States has focused on whether
SWFs are friend or foe. New York Senator Chuck Schumer, an
influential member of the Senate Finance Committee, recently gave an
interview, during which he was asked: "[I]s there any real evidence that
these funds plan to use their investments to further political agendas?"'
His response, indicative of the general attitude in Congress, was "[w]ell,
there's no track record. They're brand new. So we just don't know.....
So setting rules ... is the right thing to do."6
The term 'sovereign wealth fund' is a recent one, attributed to
Andrew Rozanov's paper Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?' However,
SWFs have been around for years, the first being created in the 1950s.'
There is no universally accepted definition for SWFs, but a composite
sketch would state a government controlled investment vehicle with
widely varying objectives. 9 Because there is no agreed upon definition, an
exact count is difficult, but the United States Government Accountability
Office estimates forty-eight SWFs exist in at least thirty-four countries. 1o
I Maria Bartiromo, Chuck Schumer on de Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Bus. WK., Mar. 6, 2008,
available at httpv/www.businessweekconmmagazine/content/081l/b4075021424117.htm.
2 See generally Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make the U.S. Economy Stronger or Pose National
Security Risks?: Hearing Before theJoint Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 20-21 (2008) (testimony of Douglas
Rediker, Co-Director, Global Strategic Financial Initiative) (reporting to the Committee on
transparency and disclosure issues).
SSee generally Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Sec'y of Treasury, Remarks on Open Investment Before
the U.S.-UAE Business Council June 3, 2008) (focusing in particular on issues for the United States and the
Middle East).
4 Seegenerally MARTINAWEISS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND PouCY ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS, CRS REP. RL 34336, at 1-2 (2008), available at fpc.state.gov/documents/organization
110750.pdf
s Bartiromo, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 See generally Andrew Rozanov, Who Holds the Wealdi ofNatois, 15 CENT. BANKINGJ. 52 (2005).
8 Mathias Audit, Is the Ercting of Barriers Against Foregn Soveregn Wealth Funds Compatible wiA
Intemational Investment Lna 1 (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. L, Working Paper No. 29/08, 2008) (starting with the
creation of the Kuwait Investment Authority ("KIA") and Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund).
9 STEPHEN JEN, CURRENCIES: THE DEFINITION OF A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 1 (Oct. 25,
2007), http/sovereignwealthfunds.files.wordpress.conv2008/01/the-definition-of-a-sovereign-wealth-fund-
morgan-stanley-october-2007.pdf
to U.S. Govr AccouNTABullY OFFICE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: IAWS UMITING
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The government directly controls SWFs or, in some cases, indirectly
through a government entity." This decision balances two key interests -
the need for control compared with isolation from political pressures. 2
To address this issue, no country has yet to privatize its SWF (although
some have publicly listed subsidiaries). However, many of the key
appointed positions are pulled from the private sector.14
Based on SWF holdings, Christopher Balding, of the University of
California, Irvine, analyzed several SWF characteristics." He determined
that SWFs "demonstrate an unmistakable preference for domestic and
regional equity investment."" There are several possible explanations.
First, there may be less currency risk by investing in companies that
operate with the same currency as does the SWF." Second, the SWF may
have more knowledge about local institutions, policies and trends.'
Third, there may be an innate preference for promotion of local
businesses and projects."
Balding also noted that SWFs "hold lower risk stocks inferring from
their large cap stock preference."20 For the most part these stock positions
were diversified and incorporated debt instruments to balance the
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AFFECT CERTAIN U.S. AssETS AND AGENCIES HAVE VARIOUS ENFORCEMENT
PRoCEssEs 5 n.4 (2009), http V/www.gao.gov/new.item/dO9608.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
" Christopher Balding, A Portfolio Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Funds 12 (June 6, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with HSBC School of Business), avadable at
httpV/ssrn.corn/abstract= 1141531.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 12-13 (including the Temaske Holdings of Singapore and the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority ("ADIA")).
" Id. at 12.
IS Id. at 17-38 (including direct holdings data from Thomson One Banker and Bloomberg-, and
indirect financial flow data from central banks, international organizations, and national treasuries).
16 Balding, supra note 11, at 17 (noting that Norway and Saudi Arabia were the two biggest
exceptions).
17 The Investor, Currency Risk, MONEVATOR, Jan. 30, 2009,
httpV/monevator.conv2009/01/3(Vcurrency-risk/.
18 See Brian Perry, Evaluating Country Risk for Inmational Investing, INVESTOPEDLA,
http//www.investopedia.conrarticles/stocks/0/country-risk-for-international-investing.asp (last visited Apr.
10, 2010).
19 Bart De Meester, International Legal Aspects of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Reconciling
International Economic Law and the Law of State Immunities with a New Role of the State 5 (Nov. 3,2008)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Institute for International Law), available at
httpV/ssrn.coniabstract=1308542 (noting that one of the objectives of SWFs is to promote national socio-
economic programs).
2 Balding, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that the two biggest exceptions were the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency and Government of Singapore Investment Corporation ("GIC")).
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portfolio."' Even though SWFs invest heavily in the markets, they only
comprise 1.3% of the world's total assets, or $3 trillion.' This is far less
than many of the other major financial players.'
Despite holding a small percentage of global assets, SWFs have made
some high profile investments in recent years. In September 2007, Borse
Dubai agreed to take about a 20% stake in the NASDAQ and a 30% stake
in the London Stock Exchange.24 In October 2007, the Chinese SWF
announced a $1 billion investment in Bear Stearns.25 Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority ("ADIA") injected $7.5 billion into Citigroup for a
5% stake in the company.26 All told, Morgan Stanley estimates that SWFs
invested over $44 billion in Western financial institutions in the fourth
quarter of 2007 alone.27 And these investments have been sustained as
well. In 2008, Qatar Holding took a 13% holding in Barclays, continuing
the tradition of Western banks courting oil rich Persian Gulf Funds."
And in 2009, the Chinese SWF looked to invest a substantial amount in
the U.S. real estate market.29
21 Id. at 34.
2 Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise ofSovereign Wealth Funds, 14 LAw & Bus. REV. AM. 179,189
(2008).
Cf PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FuNDs, LEVERAGE, AND THE
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1-2 (1999), http/www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
report3097.htm (stating that at the turn of the millennium "commercial banks had $4.1 trillion in total assets;
mutual funds had assets of approximately $5 trillion; private pension funds had $43 trillion; state and local
retirement funds had $23 trillion; and insurance companies had assets of $3.7 trillion."). See also INVESTORS'
COMM., PRINCIPALS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS 1 (2008),
httpV/www.teasury.gov/press/releases/reports/mvestors'committeereportaprill52008.pdf (noting that hedge
funds have roughly $2 trillion in assets).
24 Posting of Steven Davidoff to A Guide to Speed Dating with Soveregn WealA Funds, Dealbook,
http//deabokblogs.nytimes.cor/20080115/a-g de-to-speed-daung-with-sovereign-fundsl (Jan. 20, 2010,
17:52 EST).
2 Id. (explaining the exposure due to the size of the investment, the timing, and the fact that it was a
Chinese SWF).
2 Id. See also Paul Rose, Soveregns as Shardholders, 87 N.C. L REV. 83,99 (2008) (stating that as part of
this investment, Abu Dhabi agreed not to have any ownership or control in Citi, including the restriction they
could not appoint a member to the board of directors).
2 WEISS, supra note 4, at 3. See Exhibit One - High-Profile SWF Investments in 2007 for a more
complete list
2 See Chip Cummins & Andrew Critchlow, Persian Gulfs Rich Invesors Infuse Banks with Capital,
WAU ST.J., Nov. 3,2008, at Cl.
29 LinglingWei &Jason Dean, CIC Looks To Pile Cash int U.S. Real Estate, WALL ST.J., Sept. 9,2009,
at Cl.
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND LIABILITY
These stories gained great exposure in the media, sparking debate.3 o
Conversations about SWFs have examined their operations, motives,
growth and transparency, but little attention has been paid towards its
liability. Suppose a SWF committed a securities violation, such as insider
trading, and this action damaged an investor. A plethora of issues
immediately arise with this simple fact scenario. Is there a private cause of
action? Are SWFs immune from suits? Who has jurisdiction over the
case? Where can the judgment be enforced? Furthermore, does the
United States government have any recourse against the SWF?
The current landscape for an aggrieved investor is woefully
articulated, especially compared to public and international responses.
Investors must navigate a dense jungle of requirements simply to bring a
suit. Eventually, however, most investors should succeed on this point.
The real issue is actually recovering anything. The current framework
does not adequately address this issue, thus leaving private citizens out in
the cold. This is a real issue mainly for two reasons. First, difficulty
bringing a suit and recovering damages leaves an entire group (and a large
one at that) without any redress for even egregious cases of fraud in the
market. This in turn diminishes private confidence in the market.
Second, and a derivative threat, is that investors may manifest this
frustration inappropriately. Specifically, investors may push for overly-
protectionist regulations which will choke out SWF investment
altogether. This is undesirable since it prevents a much needed stream of
capital into the United States. This leaves us with the initial question
posed by Senator Schumer - how does the United States government
appropriately walk this tight-rope between SWF investments and
regulations?"
This article will navigate through these issues and address the liability
SWFs face. Part II examines the landscape of sovereign wealth funds
more in depth, examining various definitions, performance, policy
arguments, and transparency and accounting issues. Part III investigates
the legislative environment for a private citizen who feels aggrieved by a
SWF. The most important statute in this section will be the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("Immunities Act").32 This part
concludes that an investor may win a lawsuit against a SWF, but will have
great difficulty enforcing a judgment. Part IV explores the remedies in
place for the United States government. The public sector's chances for
3 See, e.g., Chip Cummins,Abu Dhabi Fund Opens Books-A Bit, WALLST.J., Mar. 15,2010, at C1.
3 See Bartiromq supra note 1.
32 28 U.S.C. SS 1602-1611 (1976).
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recovery are strong, with most cases ultimately being arbitrated. Part V
evaluates the international responses. The General Agreement on Trades
in Services ("GATS") is significant since it is binding. " Its limitation,
however, is that it is only applicable in limited circumstances. GATS too
points towards arbitration when it's in force. The International Monetary
Fund's ("IMF") Santiago Principles are gaining wide support, but it does
not directly address this issue.34 However, the Santiago Principles do
implicitly point towards private recourse. Lastly, Part VI concludes the
article and argues for an amendment to the Immunities Act. Specifically,
this provision should tie the amount of recovery to the investment itself to
make recovery meaningful.
II. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND LANDSCAPE
A. Definitions
SWFs avoid having a standard definition. But, a look at three
representative viewpoints will help illuminate the difficulty in
classification and highlight several aspects about them. There are
numerous ways to categorize or define SWFs, including: geography, age,
source of funds, intent and size.35
First, the IMF defines sovereign wealth funds as "special-purpose
investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic
purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial
objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include investing
in foreign financial assets." 36 Furthermore, there are five types of SWFs
based on primary objectives - stabilization funds (to smooth out
commodity fluctuations), savings funds for future generations (to grow
savings accounts), reserve investment corporations (to increase the return
on reserves), development funds (to promote new socioeconomic
projects) and contingent pension reserve funds (to help future pension
funds).
3 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
GATS].
3 INT'L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:
GENERAU.Y ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACncEs: "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" 3 (2008), available at
http.v-iwg-swforgpulengsantigopriniles.pdf [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES].
3s See Lyons, supra note 22, at 202-08.
36 SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at 3.
3 INT'L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS - A WORK AGENDA 5 (2008), available at
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The IMF's definition of a SWF comes from the objective/intent camp.
First, objectives vary among countries. For instance, some countries
utilize SWFs to promote economic growth or stability whereas other
countries use them primarily to fund internal projects." Second, the
IMF's implication that SWFs operate for long-term objectives is not
universally accepted. Actually, there is quite a bit of tension as to whether
SWFs sometimes invest for quick short term deals or not." Third, the
IMF's definition suggests the source of funding may influence SWFs'
purposes (for example, stabilization funds are used primarily by oil rich
nations) 40
A second definition comes from the Peter G. Peterson Institute for
International Economics ("Peterson Institute").41 Edwin Truman, Senior
Fellow of the Peterson Institute, testified before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs in May 2008. He defined
SWF as follows:
The broadest definition of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) is a
collection of government-owned or government-controlled assets.
Narrower definitions may exclude government financial or non-
financial corporations, purely domestic assets, foreign exchange
reserves, assets owned or controlled by sub-national governmental
units, or some or all government pension funds. I use "sovereign
wealth fund" as a descriptive term for a separate pool of
government-owned or government-controlled assets that includes
some international assets. I include all government pensions, as
well as nonpensions, funds to the extent that they manage
marketable assets. The basic objectives of both types are
essentially the same. They raise virtually identical issues of best
practices - the focus of my research and analysis - in government
httpV/www.inf.orgexternl/np/pp/eng20822908.pdf
3 See WEISS, supra note 4, at 5-6.
39 Cf Somign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foregn Government Investments in the United States:
Assessing the Economic and National Security Implications, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban
Afairs, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (testimony of Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for
International Economics) [hereinafter Peterson Study] (citing Ecuador's Stabilization Fund and Nigeria's
Petroleum Trust Fund as two examples of SWFs who operated in the short term realm).
40 Int'l Monetary Fund,1MF Intensies Work on Soveregn Wealh Funds, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FuND, Mar. 4,2008, httpV/www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/sc/2008/POLO3408A-htm.
41 The Rise of Soverign Wealth Funds: Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy and Economic Interests, Bore the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (prepared statement of Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow,
Peterson Institute for International Economics).
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control and accountability regardless of their specific objectives,
mandates, or sources of funding.42
The Peterson Institute's definition focuses on composition. The
definition demonstrates that, depending on how wide or narrow one
defines a SWF, it may capture funds that are not traditionally thought of
as SWFs. For instance, a public pension plan may be considered a SWF
even though from a policy standpoint the two seem worlds apart. In
addition, the Peterson Institute's definition introduces the idea that SWFs
can invest in domestic programs as well.
And third, it is useful to review the United States' definitions to better
frame how its regulations impact them. There is no official definition but
various agencies have advanced positions. CRS takes an extremely broad
view and classifies SWFs as "investment funds owned and managed by
national governments."4 3 In contrast, the United States Treasury
Department takes a narrower view. According to the Treasury
Department, a SWF is a "government investment vehicle which is funded
by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those assets separately
from the official reserves of the monetary authorities (the Central Bank
and reserve-related functions of the Finance Ministry)."" The thrust of
the Treasury Department's definition is on composition, further dividing
SWFs into two categories - commodity funds and non-commodity
funds.45
In sum, there are several common characteristics. First, the SWF has
to be government controlled.46 Second, the SWF will invest in a wide
variety of securities." Third, SWFs operate to effectuate a variety of goals,
which largely depends on the region and status of the nation."
42 Id.
4 WEISS, supra note 4, at 1.
4 U.S. TREAsuRY DEP'T, REPORT To CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
EXCHANGE RATE POucIES, at app. 3 (2007), http/Aww.ustreas.gv/office/international-affairs/economic-
exchange-rates/pdQ2007Appendix-3.pdf.
45 Id.
4 A. Blundell-Wignall et al., Sowvign Weadd and Pension Fund Issues 4 (Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development, Working Paper No. 14,2008).
4 See id. at 10-12.
4 See id. at 4.
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B. Select Performance
Middle Eastern funds are important to highlight since they
particularly invest in the United States.49 Jassim Al Manai, Chairman of
the Arab Monetary Fund, recently commented on the relations between
SWFs and the Western beneficiaries stating SWFs should not be feared,
but they should take active measures to downplay concerns before
governments intervene with regulation.'
Even the Middle Eastern funds have struggled in the recent
conditions." Seven of the largest funds in the region were projected to
lose 15% of their value, shrinking from $1.25 trillion at the end of 2007 to
$1.06 trillion by the end of 2008.52 This change in fortune is linked to
both the global economic slowdown, as well as changes in crude oil
prices." This in turn could mark a decline in Western investments.
However, there is evidence that at least some of these funds are ready to
begin investing substantially again.54
Asian funds are important to understand because they have grown so
large, invest heavily in Western institutions and loudly voice their
opinions on transparency issues. Like Middle Eastern funds, Asian
funds have enjoyed growth for much of the new millennium.56 Rather
than being fueled by commodities, Asian funds grew through reserves.
In 2006, Asia held 54% of the $4.2 trillion in reserves worldwide."
4 See, eg., WEISS, supra note 4, at 3 ("[S]everal Middle Eastern and Asian SWFs have recently
announced or completed large deals, with a focus on multinational financial institutions following the market
turmoil in the second half of 2007.").
5 Kathryn Gordon & April Tash, Forign Gownment-Controlled Investors and Recipient Country
Investment Policies: A Scoping Paper, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, at 3
(2009), available at www.oecd.orgfdataoecd/l/21/42022469.pdf (quoting Nadim Kawack Western Fears of Gulf
SWFs Not Rational, Arab Fund Says, EMIRATEs Bus. 24/7, Sept 2,2008).
51 See Spencer Swarz, Gomnment Funds in GdfFace 15% Loss, WALL ST.J., Nov. 28,2008, at C3.
52 Id.
5 Id.
5 Cf Vladimir Guevarra & Kerry E. Grace, NYSE Takes a Stake in Qatar Exrhange, WALL ST. J.,June
22, 2009, at C2 (discussing a joint venture between NYSE Euronext and the Qatar Investment Authority);
Christoph Rauwald & Eyk Henning Porsche Nears a Qatar Deal, WALL ST.J.,June 10, 2009, at B3 (discussing a
possible deal between Porsche and Qatar Investment Authority).
5 Jason Dean et al., Chinese PremierBlames Recession on U.S. Actions, WAll ST.J.,Jan 29, 2009, at Al.
5 See WEISS, supra note 4, at &
5 Id. (driving these reserves are "[1] large trade surpluses, [2] net foreign direct investment flows,
and [31 high savings rates among Asian economies.").
5 Id at & See also Rose, supra note 26, at 88 ("[A]s reserves grow, it would be no surprise if additional
amounts were used in stages to swell the size ofChina's SWF to, say, $600 billion within two years!").
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In the past year, tensions between China's SWF and America have
become strained due to economic woes.59  Investments in Morgan
Stanley, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac burned these funds badly.' To
recover the Chinese SWFs appointed an advisory board of economic and
investment experts to counsel on "'international economic environment,
corporate governance, development strategy, and investment policy, as
well as upgrading and improving [its] corporate image and increasing
transparency."' 6 1
The Russian fund is important to examine because it's typically
vilified in American literature.62 The Russian fund was launched recently
in 2004, but has quickly jumped into the top seven in terms of assets.'
Since the fund is largely oil driven, it comes as no surprise that one of its
biggest objectives is to reduce commodity volatility.6 But the fund has
taken a low risk approach.6 ' The fund issues monthly reports to the
Russian Parliament with details about their holdings so the government
can regularly check on their SWF." Many Americans feel Russia will use
its SWF for inappropriate political gain despite the fund only taking on
modest risks and having some regulatory checks in place. 7
It may come as a surprise to learn the United States has SWFs of its
own. One fund is the Alaskan Permanent Reserve Fund.' Launched in
1976, the fund now has more than $40 billion in assets.6 ' The fund is
commodity driven, with most of its funding coming from oil revenues.70
The official objective is to provide comfort to future Alaskans once oil
reserves become scarce." The fund may come as a surprise for two
reasons. Many assume that SWFs are largely populated by Middle Eastern
and Asian nations and, thus, may not realize that some are domestic. In
s9 See Dean et al., supra note 55, at Al.
60 Id.
61 Terence Poon, China's CIC Goes Global Wth Board ofAdviers, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2009, at C2
(quoting CIC statement).
62 See, e.g., Bartiromo, supra note 1.
63 See Lyons, supra note 22, at 185,215 (holding roughly $130 billion, which accounts for 14% of the
nation's Gross Domestic Product).
64 Id.
6 Balding, supra note 11, at 24.
66 Lyons, supra note 22, at 215.
67 See, e.g., Bartiromo, supra note 1.
6 Lyons, supra note 22, at 219.
69 Id. (reporting data as of2006).
70 See id.
71 Id.
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addition, SWFs are not explicitly national creatures and several (like in this
case) are populated at the state or provincial level.72
Additionally, there are three more American funds. While the
Alaskan fund is the largest, the New Mexico State Investment Trust is the
oldest, founded in 1958." The fund holds roughly $13 billion in assets
through the only non-commodity driven funding of the American
funds.74 Moreover, there is the Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust
Fund, which holds roughly $4 billion through mineral reserves." And
lastly, the Alabama Trust Fund holds slightly more than $3 billion
through gas accumulation.
C. General Performance
The field is largely top-heavy; in 2005 the top five in assets accounted
for more than 75% of the total SWF portfolio? Since that time several
firms have gained ground; now seven funds have over $100 billion in
assets.7 ' Of the biggest twenty-two, twelve were launched after the
millennium, two in the decade preceding and eight before 1990.7' Fifteen
were largely commodity driven.'
SWFs' assets, from the top performers down, have taken a hit in the
recent economy, much like many other financial institutions.8 ' For
instance, the Monitor Group estimates that Gulf foreign reserves and
SWFs have a combined loss of $350 billion for 2008.82 Even the largest
SWF, the United Arab Emirates' ADIA now faces losses.' This effect has
72 See id. (explaining the State ofAlaska owns the Alaskan Permanent Reserve Fund).
7 See Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, New Mexico State Investment Office Trust (2009),
httpf/www.swfinstitute.org/fund/newmexico.php.
7 See id.
7s Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund (2009),
httpV/www.swfinstitute.org/find/wyoming.php (reporting that the Fund was founded in 1974).
76 Sovereign Wealth Fund institute, Alabama Trust Fund (2009),
http;/www.swfimstitute.orgffundalabamaphp (reporting that the Fund was founded in 1986).
- Rozanov, supra note 7, at 53 (stating, as well, that the biggest five are the ADIA, Government
Petroleum Fund, GIC, Investment Portfolio and KIA).
78 Lyons, supra note 22, at 185.
7 Id. at 202.
8 Id. at 204.
81 See Economist Staff From Tonent to Trible: Sovmergn Wealdd Funds: The Flows are Neither as Big nor as
Scary as They Once Seemed, EcONOMIST,Jan. 26,2009 [hereinafter Tonent to Trible].
82 Id.
8 Swartz, supra note 51, at C3. But see WEISS, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that beforehand ADIA had
enjoyed a 20% rate of return for many years).
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been seen throughout the world, in one form or another.' For example,
Russian and Chinese SWFs have concentrated their extra reserves to shore
up domestic stability rather than stimulate their foreign investment
arms.85
It is hard to pinpoint the total number of assets because transparency
and disclosure regulations vary widely among nations." For instance,
estimates about the largest SWF, ADIA, vary as much as $500 to $900
billion!' Currently, there are no agreed upon disclosure requirements
across nations.' Gary Kleiman, a senior partner at Kleiman International
Consultants, commented "'[i]n terms of disclosure on fund performance,
investment strategy, or even basic philosophy, many [SWFs] rank below
the most secretive hedge fund.'"'
The Monitor Group, a global advising and research firm, recently
released a report studying the behavior and transactions of SWFs entitled
Assessing the Risks: The Behaviors of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Global
Economy.' The report was based on roughly 1,200 transactions from
twenty-five funds spanning from 1975 to 2008."
The report drew three key conclusions. First, the data suggests that
SWFs are primarily driven by financial, not political, motives.' Second,
SWFs do, in fact, take controlling stakes in companies.' Half of the
public transactions involving SWFs resulted in majority positions;
however, for the most part these transactions have involved domestic
sectors." Third, SWFs have progressively been taking on greater risks,
investing in less conservative asset classes."
8 See Tonnt to Tricke, supra note 81.
85 See id.
8 WESS, supm note 4, at 9.
87 Id.
8 Id. at 13. Cf Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Intnsifies Work on Sonmmn Wealth Funds, IMF SURVEY
MAGAZINE ONuNE, Mar. 4, 2008, httpV//ww.imforgfexteral/pubs/ft/survey/sQ20WPOLO48Ahtm
(discussing the International Monetary Fund's efforts to establish industry standanis).
8 WEiss, supra note 4, at 13.
9 See Press Release, Monitor Group, Monitor Group Releases Seminal Report on Sovereign Wealth
Funds (June 9, 2008) [hereinafter Monitor Press Release] (commenting on the study, Mark Fuller, Monitor
Group's Chairman, stated that "[w]e have seen a glut of opinion about the danger sovereign wealth funds






9 Monitor Press Release, supra note 90.
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The report also makes three predictions. First, SWFs will become an
important fixture in global financial markets." Second, the trend of
investing in higher risk asset classes will continue. Third, the push for
greater regulatory oversight will increase, particularly concerning
transparency issues.
The Monitor Group's first prediction, SWFs will grow in numbers
and importance, has been echoed by others.' Currently, SWFs hold over
$3 trillion in assets,'" accounting for roughly 1.3% of the world's total
$167 trillion in assets. 'o According to Stephen Jen, a Morgan Stanley
Managing Director and Chief Currency Economist, this figure is expected
to balloon to $12 trillion by the year 2015.102 This prediction is backed by
data on current SWF growth. In 2007, the growth rate for individual
funds varied from zero to 100% in a small sample of funds." An accepted
industry average for growth throughout the year was just under 20%."
This growth is based on several reasons. First, the rise in commodity
prices has been influential.'o Particularly, rising oil prices help fuel the
surging Middle Eastern SWFs.'06  Second, a general increase in "large
trade surpluses, net foreign direct investment flows, and high savings rates
among Asian economies" helped Asian SWFs rise in strength.' Reserve
accumulation has been particularly important in the accession of China's
SWF, in which there has been a concerted effort to limit the Yuan's
appreciation to the dollar.' The increase is staggering. Ten years ago
"Asian central banks accounted for one-third of global currency reserves,
now they account for two-thirds.""
9 Id.
9 Id. This finding however, may be nullified to some extent in the immediate short term due to the
financial situation afflicting the globe. Id
98 Id.
9 Stephen Jen, Cunencies How Much Assets Could SWFs Fann Out?, MORGAN STANLEY GLOBAL
ECON. FORUM (Jan. 11, 2008), httpV ww.morganstanley.convMews/geflarchive2008/2008011 1-Fri.htnl.
t0 Balding, supra note 11, at 3.
101 Lyons, supra note 22, at 189.
102 Daniel Gross, SWF ISO Bailout, SLATE, May 22,2009, httpVAvww.slate.corn/idf2218845.
103 Lyons, supra note 22, at 187.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 187.
ton WEIss, supra note 4, at 4.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Lyons, supra note 22, at 186.
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A third growth factor, the investment performance of SWFs, helps
promote a self-reinforcing schedule."o As funds invested more money,
they received larger returns, which in turn let them invest more in the
market."' And fourth, the discretionary factors have changed over time."12
How SWFs are funded and what they are allowed to trade in has changed
for the betterment of the SWFs."3
Rozanov highlighted three reasons why the growth in SWFs would
gain significant attention.114 First, as SWFs grow in numbers and size
their market influence will continue to escalate."s Second, because SWFs
are in such a unique position they are particularly valuable to achieve
macroeconomic policies (or in other words, nationalistic objectives)."'
And third, other managers (such as central bank managers) might begin to
mirror SWF managers." 7
D. Policy Arguments
The focus of this article is not whether SWFs are good or bad,
nonetheless, the article must acknowledge the policy debate. Many
support SWFs as bastions of new funds."' In general, the Bush
Administration was supportive of SWF investments, with former
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr. commenting that "[m]oney is
naturally going to gravitate toward dollar-based assets because of the
strength of our economy .. . I'd like nothing more than to get more of
that [SWF] money.""'
In addition, SWFs help the marketplace in general. SWFs face less
pressure to reduce their size because they generally have no commercial





114 Rozanov, supra note 7, at 53-54.
115 Id. at 53.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 53-54 (mirroring in terms ofstructure and investment strategies).
"1 See Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Address to the Sovereign Wealth
Management Conference: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Imbalances 3 (Mar. 14, 2008) (transcript
available at the Bank for International Settlements, httpV/www.bis.org/review/r080319d.pdf).
119 Steven R Weisman, Conen About 'Soerign W&4dd Funds' Spreads to Washington, N.Y TIMES, Aug.
20, 2007, available at httpVAvww.nytimes.corn/2007/20/businessiworldbusinessf20iht-wealth.4.
7186699.htmL
120 Gieve, supra note 118, at 3.
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good or bad times, SWFs provide liquidity.12' Second, SWFs help their
own countries as well. When SWFs produce gains they invest money into
their own infrastructure, helping to raise citizens' quality of life.'" In
addition, SWFs can provide protection against income fluctuations,
providing reserves for bad times." Third, when the fund is transparent
(such as the Norwegian fund), SWFs help contribute to the accountability
in the management of government funds. 24 And fourth, one subtle
advantage is that SWFs may align their interests with their investments. 25
For example, if a Chinese SWF invests in an African bank, the Chinese
would then have an interest in that African bank's health (and by
extension the entire African economy).2 6
These sentiments have largely been echoed in the market.127  The
Chinese Investment Corporation's investment in Morgan Stanley
produced a 5.84% increase the first day of trading after the
announcement, contrasted to the Standard & Poor's 1.67%.128 And Dubai
World's foray into MGM yielded an incredible 8.92% increase, well above
the 1.54% of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").129
Despite these advantages, SWFs do pose risks. National security is the
most cited concern. Officials feel threatened that countries could use
SWFs to obtain technological or informational advantages, disrupt
markets, distort energy supplies and subvert infrastructure. 0 The
Monitor Group's report found that less than one percent of investments
were in the fields of defense, aerospace, transportation and technology,
but that does not preclude future activity."'
121 See id.
12 See De Meester, supra note 19, at 5-6.
123 Id. at 6.
124 Id.
125 Id at 7.
126 Cf Terence Poon & Aaron Back, China Fund to 1xpand Africa Ties, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, at
A10 (documenting the creation and expansion of the China-Africa Development Fund as part of the ongoing
relationship).
127 Rose, supra note 26, at 123-24 (concluding that following four of the six largest SWF investments
the market responded more positively than the overall market change).
128 Id. at 124.
129 Id. But see Velijko Fotak et al., The Financial Impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in
Listed Companies 2-3, 7 (Working Paper, Sept. 18, 2008), available at http-f/ssrn.condabstract=1108585
(detailing a new study suggesting the share prices of companies that SWFs have invested in have declined over
time).
13 See De Meester, supra note 19, at 7.
131 Id. at 7-8.
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Second, many economists felt SWF investments in failing Western
financial institutions were inappropriate."12 Recessions help remove
ineffective management and poorly performing companies from the
marketplace.' Thus, SWFs disrupted a natural part of the business cycle
by propping up failing institutions.134 Tangentially, the inclusion of SWFs
as shareholders now opens the door for dilemmas down the line when
heads of companies or states have to make policy choices that may affect
SWF shareholders.'
Third, some feel SWFs will receive unequal, or preferential, treatment
over other shareholders.' This is because SWFs may have access to
superior information and positions, since they benefit from data the
government collects.'37 Fourth, an extension of earlier concerns, is that
"some governments question whether their regulatory framework is
sufficient to avoid market manipulation and insider trading by SWFs.
Even though these rules are without doubt also applicable to SWFs, it is
feared that the SWF could hide behind the law of State immunities." 38
Fifth, the United States gives preferential tax treatment to income a
foreign government receives from its investments in the United States.3 9
Sixth, many economists fear SWF investments themselves." SWFs may
have huge positions creating a risk of instability if a SWF were to suddenly
sell their shares.141 Other investors may feel the SWF had undisclosed
information and thus would pull out as well.'42 For example, nearly 50%
132 See d. at 8.
133 See id. (depicting a process sometimes known as creative destruction. It stands for the premise that
weaker companies will fail, and only the strongest companies will survive).
134 See id.
35 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 26, at 94 ("What about the day when a country joins some 'coalition of the
willing' and asks the U.S. president to support a tax break for a company in which it has invested? Or when a
decision has to be made about whether to bail out a company, much of whose debt is held by an ally's central
bank?" (quoting Lawrence Summers, Economist)).
136 Se De Meester, supra note 19, at 9.
13s Id.
138 Id.
139 See I.RC. S 892(a)(1) (2009). See Victor Fleischer, Should We Tec Sovemgn Wealh Funds?, 118
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 93 (2008), available at httpV/thepockepartorgf2008/11/17/fleischer.html (noting this
tax treatment discourages private foreign investment and neglects a useful way the United States can exert
influence over SWFs).
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of SWFs investments are in the financial industry.143 If SWFs were to
suddenly pull out of this sector, then the entire financial industry could be
seriously impaled.'"
And lastly, what happens when SWFs lose money? SWFs have
increasingly invested in risky assets.'45 Furthermore, the global
performance for SWFs is in decline, as evidenced earlier.' 6 The
government may need to pull money from other areas to support its
SWFs, or, they may have to quickly sell their position, which exacerbates
the situation. 14 In sum, there are numerous arguments in favor of and
against SWF investments. The main argument for SWiF investments is
the inclusion of a new stream of capital insulated from many market
pressures. The main argument against S'WF investments is the concern
for national security and market protection.
E. Transparency and Accountability
The issues with transparency are severe. First, how governments
should assess SWF risks suffers due to a lack of transparency. 48 Second,
and as a consequence, how governments should regulate SWFs suffers as
well.149
The problems with low accountability are even more startling. First,
there is the obvious risk that the SWF (and by extension the government)
will mismanage these investments for personal political or economic
gain.150 Second, tit-for-tat protectionism responses may arise due to a lack
of cooperation and understanding.'"' Third, poor management could lead
to uncertainty, market turmoil and eventual decline.'52 And fourth, the




145 De Meester, supra note 19, at 9.
146 See, e.g., Tonnt to Thrckle, supra note 81, at 78-80.
147 See De Meester, supra note 19, at 9.
148 See WEISS, supra note 4, at 14.
149 See generally id (speaking to the fact that governments cannot properly isolate overall, let alone
specific, concerns to address without transparency).
1S0 Peterson Study, supra note 39, at 4.
151 See id (predicting foreign SWF abuse will cause a country to anticipatorily enact protectionist
measures. Once one country has done so, the likelihood that other countries will rush to do so as well
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The Peterson Institute conducted an empirical study to fully
determine SWFs' transparency and accountability.'" The Peterson Study
asked twenty-five questions to various SWFs, giving points for a yes
answer (or partial points in some cases) and zero points for a no
response.'" The questions were broken into four groups - Structure,
Governance, Transparency and Accountability, and Behavior. 56
Examples of the Structure questions include: Are the SWF's objectives
clearly identified?; Are the fund's sources clearly indicated?; Are the
fund's uses clearly disclosed?; And are procedural considerations clearly
established?'
Governance questions include: Is there a set of ethical guidelines?;
Are there publicly available guidelines for the corporate actions?; And is
the manager's role clearly defined?"' Transparency and Accountability
questions ask details about the type and frequency of reports to investors,
the audit structure and information on returns.'s The Behavior category
consisted of just a single question - "Does the SWF indicate the nature
and speed of adjustment in its portfolio?""
The purpose behind the study was to collect data to move towards the
development of best practices.'" The Peterson Institute had to use its
own judgment in some cases because the information collected was based
on public information. 62 It is important to keep in mind SWFs are spread
out over a great deal of countries. Some considerations may be relevant to
one SWF, but not to another." For instance, a SWF may have answered
"no" to having an audit process, but because of their unique position, that
fund does not need one.
The Peterson Study is a useful tool in several aspects. First, the
Peterson Study shows that most SWFs are not scoring high on
transparency and accountability issues.'" Second, the study highlights a
154 See generly id. (collecting data from thirty-two separate funds via surveys).
155 Peterson Study, supra note 39, app. at 16.
156 Id.
157 See id. app. at 17-18.
158 Id. app. at 18-19.
5 Id. at 19-20.
160 Peterson Study, supra note 39, app. at 21 (revealing all of the data, the study published the
individual answers to all twenty-five questions in Table 4 ofthe Study). See Exhibit Two - Peterson Study
Scoresheet, with the fourth entry being the United States California Public Employees' Retirement System
(CalPERS) as a benchmark
161 Peterson Study, supra note 39, app. at 17.
162 Id.
163 See id.
164 See gnerally id.
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discrepancy between American and foreign regulations.' And third, the
Peterson Study helps predict areas of resistance for future reform.16
M. PRIvATE RESPONSE
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Immunities Act Background
Sovereign immunity has enjoyed a long history. The notion has roots
dating back to "Roman and Canon law, tribal customs, and feudal
traditions."167 The idea of extending the doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity has equally been long-standing. The United States has always
followed the doctrine." The rationale behind this is two-fold. First, the
predominant view is that sovereign immunity (including foreign
sovereign immunity) is a fundamental state right."' Second, foreign
sovereign immunity works as a practical consideration to foster
international cooperation and interactions between states.170
The Supreme Court first recognized this doctrine of international law
in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. "' Chief Justice Marshall upheld a
French naval ship's immunity plea, which was supported by the Executive
Branch in a letter, based on the wide acceptance of foreign sovereign
immunity.172 The Court would come to rely more and more on these
letters from the State Department." This practice culminated in the Ex
Parte Peru and the Mexico v. Hoffman decisions.'7 4 In response to these
cases, the State Department adopted the restrictive view of sovereign
165 See id.
16 See generally Peterson Study, supra note 39.
167 Matthew A. Melone, Should de United States Tax Sowmmn Wealth Funds?, 26 B.U. INTL LJ. 143,
176(2008).
168 Cf Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F.Cas. 574 (Adm. Ct Pa. 1781) (No. 9,697) (holding that
the seamen on board a vessel belonging to a foreign sovereign could not sue for wages).
169 See Melone, supra note 167, at 180.
170 Id. at 181.
171 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
172 McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 147; H.R REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprined in 1976 U.S.C.CAN.
6604.
173 H.R REP. No. 94-1487, at 8.
174 Id. (referring to Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (holding that a Peruvian commercial ship was
immune, even though it was operating in a purely commercial setting)); see also Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30 (1945) (denying immunity to a Mexican commercial ship based on extremely similar facts). The clearest
distinction between the two cases is the State Department's endorsement of immunity in the first suit, but
denial of its support in the second. See generally Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (holding that a Peruvian
commercial ship was immune, even though it was operating in a purely commercial setting).
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immunity, modeled after the Tate Letter of 1952.s17 The restrictive view's
main rationale is to grant foreign immunity in cases of public acts, but not
those centered on commercial or private acts.'7 1 However, the State
Department did not follow the Tate Letter or the restrictive view in all
instances, which led to a great deal of confusion."
Congress passed the Immunities Act in 1976 in response to this
confusion.' Congress had several purposes behind enacting the statute.
First, the Immunities Act would codify the restrictive principle; second
the statute would provide procedural guidance; and third this would offer
relief for a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against a foreign
sovereign defendant."'7  This third purpose, private relief, is important in
shaping the eventual solution to the problem of SWF liability. The
globalization of financial markets means increasing interactions between
foreign sovereigns and private parties, thus making the Immunities Act
increasingly valuable as well."
B. Immunities Act Application
The first step in this process is for the defendant to assert that the
foreign state qualifies for protection under the statute.' 8' The Immunities
Act defines a foreign state as "a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."" An agency or
instrumentality is further defined as a "separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise" and "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof."" The House Report that
accompanies the Immunities Act indicates Congressional intent to
interpret these definitions broadly.'"
17s H.R REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, see also Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Iegal Adviser of Dep't of
State, to Philip Perlman, Acting U.S. Atty Gen. (May 19, 1952), rprinted in 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
176 H.R REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (discussing the absolute immunity doctrine which grants immunity
for commercial or private acts).
'7 CHARLES BALDWIN, IVet al., INTERNATIONALCIVILDISPUTE RESOLuTION 565 (2d ed. 2008).
178 28 U.S.C. S 1330 (1976); .s abo Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-583,
90 Stat. 1976 (codified in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.).
' H.R REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8.
IO See Melone, supra note 167, at 158.
181 28 U.S.c S 1604 (1976).
182 Id. S 1603(a).
183 Id. S 1603(b)(1)-(2).
' H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15-16 ("[E]ntities which meet the definition of an 'agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state' could assume a variety of forms, including a state trading
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In interpreting the third category, courts have recognized that
companies that are owned by a foreign state will qualify.'s Furthermore,
the definition under section 1603(b)(2) allows for companies to qualify
where only the majority of shares are owned by the foreign state. 1 6 That
shares of the SWF may be traded in a market or that the SWF acts in
ordinary commercial dealings will not force them out of the category."
In sum, there are three separate categories an entity can fall into -
foreign state proper, a political subdivision, or an agency or
instrumentality. Courts have employed several factors to distinguish the
categories, including "ownership and management of the entity; . . .
whether such entity is actively supervised by the state; whether the foreign
state requires the entity to employ public employees; whether the entity
holds some exclusive national right or rights; and the entities treatment
under the foreign state's laws."188
Which of the three categories a SWF falls into is important for several
reasons. First, this categorization can impact the procedural postures of
the case, including notice, venue and discovery.' Second, the
categorization can impact the settlement, particularly with the issues of
punitive damages and execution."
SWFs' operations vary dramatically from nation to nation, but SWFs
will mostly fall under the last category - agency or instrumentality. SWFs
are owned and operated by the government or a government-linked
entity. 91 They must actively report their holdings to the government and
corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as a shipping line or airline, a steel
company, a central bank, an export association, a governmental procurement agency or a department
or ministry which acts and is suable in its own name.").
185 See, e.g., Lopez del Valle v. Gobierno de la Capital, 855 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D.P.R 1994) (granting
foreign sovereign status to a Venezuelan supplier whose shares were 100% owned by a Venezuelan
nationalized company).
186 See 28 U.S.C. S 1603(b)(2); see abo Carey v. Nat'i Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding the National Oil Company qualified as a foreign state under the Immunities Act since a majority of
its shares were held by Libya).
187 Erickson v. Alitalia, No. 90-3895,1991 WL 117797, at *2-3 (D.N.J. June 5,1991).
188 Melone, supra note 167, at 185 (relying on Michael A. Granne, Defining "Organ ofa Foreign State"
Under The Foreign Soteeign Immunities Aa of 1976 (2008), avarlable at
http-//orks.bepress.cornrichaelgrame/1/).
'8 Compare 28 U.S.C. 5 1610(a), with 28 U.S.C. 5 1610(b) (highlighting some of the differences
between foreign states proper and agencies or instrumentalities. In these sections, immunity for foreign states
proper will also consider international law, rights in property, or use of the property).
' See, e.g., id. S 1606.
191 Balding, supra note 11, at 12
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are subject to review.'" Furthermore, the funds are supported by state
resources (such as tax revenue).'93 Lastly, they are treated as entities of the
state by foreign governments, economists and other interested parties.'94
Now that the defendant is recognized as a foreign sovereign, the
plaintiff must place the case in an exception in order to proceed. The first
exception is when the SWF has contractually waived its immunity.'9 5
This will most likely come into play when the SWF is engaged in business
with another major player, such as a hedge fund or pension plan.
Absent a contract the most obvious exception is section 1605(a)(2),
which reads:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case - in which
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States .. .196
Based on this definition three separate interpretive problems arise.'97
First, what constitutes commercial activity?198 Second, when is an action
based on commercial activity or in connection with it?'99 Third, what exactly
is the nexus needed between the activity and the United States?2 00
The Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. is the seminal case in
determining what is commercial activity.20 To stabilize its economy,
Argentina issued bonds to be paid in American dollars to several markets,
192 See Peterson Study, supra note 39, at 9, 14.
193 See De Meester, supra note 19, at 3.
194 See id. at 4.
195 28 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(1) (1976).
1% Id. S 1605(a)(2) (explaining the rationale behind the exception is that by acting in a commercial
setting a foreign sovereign is no longer acting in an official sovereign capacity and should therefore not enjoy
immunity).
197 GARY B. BoRN & PETER B. RuTI.EDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL ITIGATION IN UNTED STATES




201 Republic of Arg v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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including New York.2 02 Argentina felt they did not have the necessary
funds to retire the bonds when they matured so it unilaterally decided to
extend the payment dates.203 Several bondholders sued; Argentina
asserted sovereign immunity under the Immunities Act as a defense.204
The main issue before the Supreme Court was if these actions fell under
the commercial activity exception.205
The Court noted that "[w]hen a foreign government acts, not as a
regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within that
market, its actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the
[Immunities Act]." 206 Furthermore, since the Immunities Act specifically
states the purpose is not the key factor, it matters not whether the
government was aiming to make money or improve the markets, etc.207
Rather, since it is the nature of the activity, the key concern is if this is the
type of activity a private player would engage in or not.208 Most SWF
activity would pass this first prong since their investments are
predominantly garden variety (i.e. buying shares, bonds, and options).
This leads into the second issue - when is the activity based upon or in
connection with commercial activity? The Supreme Court in Saudi Arabia
v. Nelson addressed this issue. 209 Nelson, an American, worked at a Saudi
Arabia hospital before he charged them with illegal detention and
torture.210 Saudi Arabia relied on the Immunities Act as a defense and
Nelson argued that section 1605(a)(2)'s commercial activity applied.21'
The Court stated that "the phrase is read most naturally to mean those
elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under
his theory of the case." 212 Most cases involving an American plaintiff
should qualify since most likely an American corporation, market or
financial activity was affected.
Even if the action survives the first two prongs, it may not qualify if it
does not pass the third element - nexus to the United States. The
Immunities Act section 1605(a)(2) lists three scenarios, or relationships,
W2 Id. at 609.
2 Id. at 610.
204 Id.
M Id. at 610-11.
2 Weover, 504 U.S. at 607.
M Id. at 614.
208 Id.
09 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
210 Id. at 352-54.
211 Id. at 355-56.
212 Id. at 357.
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that would satisfy the nexus requirement.213 First, the actions could be
carried out in the United States itself; second, an act could be performed
in the United States in connection with commercial activity that occurred
elsewhere; or third, an act could be performed outside the United States
in connection with a commercial activity that also occurred outside the
United States, but with direct effects inside the nation.2 14
The specific facts will be important in determining if the nexus
requirement has been met. Examples of the first category include
violations that involve American exchanges, false representations made in
the United States, or shares of American corporations.215 Most notably
the second category involves securities violations that occurred outside the
United States, but involve American corporations, exchanges or buyers.2 16
The third category has more remote claims, but includes securities
violations that directly affect American shareholders or markets.2 17
In general, a SWF will qualify as a foreign sovereign as defined by the
Immunities Act. If a plaintiff wishes to proceed, he or she will need to fit
the situation into an exception to immunity. First, contractual waivers
will be the best case scenario.2 18 Second, absent a contract, a plaintiff will
most likely rely on the commercial activity exception.219 In either case, the
plaintiff will most likely be able to bring a suit against the SWF.
C. Private Recovery
Currently, the United States is not part of any official international
treaty that requires reciprocal treatment of judgments.220 Therefore,
enforcement of a United States verdict in a foreign country would rely on
the internal laws of that foreign country and the international ideas of
213 28 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(2) (1976).
214 Id. See also Republic of Arg v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992) (navigating through the
nexus requirement).
215 H.R REP. No. 94-1487, at 16 (including "its investment in a security of an American
corporation").
216 Id. at 19 (including "an act in the United States that violates U.S. securities laws or regulations").
217 Id.
218 28 U.S.C. 5 1605(a)(1) (1976).
219 See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
22 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS,
httpV/trveLstate.gov/lawfmfojudiciaVjudicial-691.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (explaining that two
plausible reasons for this are: 1) foreign states feel that United States awards are overly generous in relation to
liability and 2) foreign states have "objected to the extraterritorial jurisdiction asserted by courts in the United
States.").
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comity, reciprocity and finality." In general, however, a domestic
judgment will be enforced if: 1) the original court had proper jurisdiction;
2) the new court has jurisdiction; 3) procedural matters in general were
properly enforced (such as notice); 4) there was no fraud in the
proceedings; and 5) enforcement of the judgment would not violate that
country's public policies.tm Some countries require that there be specific
reciprocity agreements in place.m
Even if one wins the suit and wins the battle for enforcement, the
complex issues of attachment and execution remain. Sections 1609
through 1611 of the Immunities Act outline when and how much
property can be attached to the suit.224 This issue is magnified in intensity
when a party will have to execute the judgment in a foreign country.2
The best case scenario would be when the foreign government of the
SWF itself has consented to adjudicative measures or property to be
attached." This is most likely the case when a SWF contracts with a
hedge fund, corporation or other powerful player." Truman has
indicated that he feels most arms-length contracts with SWFs are
sufficient, presumably because they incorporate arbitration or other
provisions.
Absent this contract, a plaintiff would need property that is both
located in the forum and connected to the current dispute229  Finding
sufficient property in the forum that is connected to the current dispute will
be a problem, especially when the SWF's actions affect a whole class of
investors. This means that an entire class of investors will be left with no
recourse. Private investors are not given the opportunity to contract with
a SWF and therefore must rely on existing laws. When these laws break
221 Id.
222 Se id.
223 Margaret A Dale, Enforcing U.S.Judgments Abroad, in Proskauer on International Litigation and
Dispute Resolution: Managing, Resolving, and Avoiding Cross-Border Business or Regulatory Disputes (Jan.
2009), http/www.proskauerguide.conVlitigation/1WIl.
2 28 U.S.C. SS 1609-1611 (1976).
M See JOSEPH W. DEIAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
400-01 (Bureau of National Affairs 1988).
226 See De Meester, supra note 19, at 35.
7 Sovregn Weadd Funds: New Challenges From a ChanRing Landscape Before the H. Subcomm. on Domestic
and Int'I Monetary Poliry, Trade and Tedh., 110th Cong. 13 (2008) (testimony of Edwin M. Truman, Senior
Fellow, Peterson Institute), available at www.house.gov/financialservices/hearingl10/trumanO91008.pdf
228 .
22 See 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a) (1976).
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The United States has several vehicles to bring an action against a
SWF. First, SWFs must comply with a plethora of securities regulations.
The main ones are highlighted here. SWFs investing in the United States
need to comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's ("Exchange
Act") Rule 16(a) requirement that issuer's officers or directors and 10%
holders disclose their ownership interest to the SEC."' The Exchange
Act's Rule 13(d) requires all owners of 5% or more of an issuer's equity
securities to file a Form 13D. 2 In limited instances, investors controlling
between 5% and 20%, who do not intend to gain control may file a Form
13G." Institutional investment managers who exercise over $100
million must file a 13F as well.84
Second, there are many sector specific requirements that SWFs must
comply with." At least seven of the biggest sectors in the United States
economy have specific laws, including - Transportation,
Communications, Banking, Natural Resources and Energy (nuclear),
Natural Resources and Energy (mineral), Defense, and Agriculture."6
These regulations restrict control, limit the percentage a SWF can hold,
and modify the disclosure requirements and other safety measures.2
The third public measure is the Exon-Florio Provision, passed in
1988." This provision gives the President the ability to block deals from
2o See gerally Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Address at the American
Enterprise Institute Legl Center for the Public Interest The Rise of Sovereign Business (Dec. 5, 2007)
(transcript available at httpV/www.sec.gov/news/speechf20O7/spchl205(7cc.htm) [hereinafter Chairman Cox
Speech] (noting private participants need confidence in anti-fraud and transparency measures to engage in the
market, otherwise the capital market itselfwould collapse).
231 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5 16(a), 15 U.S.C. S 7 8p (2009).
232 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5 13(d); 17 C.F.R S 240.13d-1(a) (2008). See also id. S 240.13d-
101 for Form 13D.
23 17 C.F.R S 240.13d-1 (2008). See also id. S 240.13d-102 for Form 13G.
2 15 U.S.C. S 78m (1978). See also 17 C.F.R 5 249.325 for Form 13F.
23S See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 15-16.
236 Id.
2 See id. See Exhibit Three -Sector Specific Laws for Foreign Investors for more details.
2' Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 5 2170 (2000) (amending Title
VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. S 2061 (1950)).
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foreigners that would raise national security concerns? President
Reagan, in an Executive Order, left the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") to regulate these
provisions.2 Since CFIUS took over, there has been a decline in the
number of cases brought each year.24 ' There is, however, some question
as to whether the Exon-Florio National Security Test would apply to
SWFs.242 To be blocked by the President, he or she must determine that
no other legal remedies are available, and more immediately, that the SWF
takes over a controlling position.243
This provision was enhanced in October 2007 when the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act took effect.2" This Act extends the
ability to review foreign investments for security purposes to transactions
involving critical infrastructure and energy.245 Some of the important
changes include the definition of foreign person, covered transaction
concept, penalties and other provisions.246 It is worth noting that at least
twenty-five countries around the world have similar national protections
to the United States (including commercial exceptions and executive
intervention) .247
Private investors have a single course of action. This is starkly
different to the public, which has several options. The legislature (and
agencies) have outlined a variety of regulations SWFs must follow. In
addition, the Executive Branch has the power to suspend SWF activity in
239 See id. S 2170(b)(1)(D).
240 See Exec. Order No. 12661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988).
241 See JAMES K JACKSON, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNTED STATES
(CFIUS), CRS REP. RL 33388, at 17 n.42 (citing CFIUS, WASH. POsT, July 3, 2005, at F3), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsedR33388.pdf [hereinafter JACKSON] ("CFIUS has received more than 1,500
notifications since 1988, of which it conducted a fifll investigation of 25 cases. Of these 25 cases, thirteen
transactions were withdrawn upon notice that CFIUS would conduct a full review and twelve of the
remaining transactions cases were sent to the President. Of these twelve transactions, one was prohibited.").
242 WEISS, supra note 4, at 17.
243 See id. See also JACKSON, supra note 241, at 4-5.
244 Foreign Investment and National Security Act, Pub. L No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 46 (2007) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. 5 2170).
245 50 U.S.C. app. 5 2170(0(6) (2007).
246 See id S 2170 see also Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, CFIUS Review on Foreign Investment U.S.
Treasury Department Proposes New Regulations to Govern National Security Review of Foreign Investment
in the United States. (May 8, 2008), httpf/www.sulcrom.compublications/detail.aspx pub=444 (analyzing
how the new act will affect the process).
247 See Gordon & Tash, supra note 50, at 17 (stating that the additional countries are: Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Luxembourg
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK).
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the name of public safety. This multi-directional approach directly feeds
into the fact that the public has a higher chance of recovery.
B. Public Recovery
The public's chances of recovery are far superior to an individual's.
First, SWF compliance with domestic regulation is a widely accepted
principle.248 To ensure compliance, the SEC works very closely with its
overseas counterparts.249 This means the government (a would be
plaintiff) and the SWF (defendant) already have a working relationship.
This relationship will strengthen the chances of cooperation in the event
of a violation.
Second, the United States has signed five bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") with nations that have SWFs.250 Almost all BIT agreements
include an arbitration clause, most of which refer to the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").2" Third, and
related, the United States has entered into free trade agreements with six
SWF countries and another two are pending.252 Free trade agreements
also often include arbitration requirements as well. These eleven
agreements are tantamount to the contractual scenario in the private
response. This means that the United States has preemptively addressed
the issue of liability and recovery in eleven cases (and another two
pending).
Fourth, there is a bigger incentive to comply with the United States
for numerous reasons. The United States could be seeking to recover in a
bigger lawsuit. The United States and the SWF country will most likely
have to negotiate future deals, and therefore the need for a strong
relationship is key.
For a variety of reasons the Unites States' chances of recovering at
least something are strong. So far, there have been no instances of the
U.S. suing or going to arbitration with a SWF. However, the process is
248 Sw, eg., SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at 15.
249 See Chairman Cox Speech, supra note 230.
2 See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10 (demonstrating that the five BITs are with Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Russia, and Trinadad and Tobago. In addition, "Vietnam has entered into a bilateral trade agreement
with the United States that contains an investment chapter similar to a BIT.").
251 See Audit, supra note 8, at 9; see also Gordon & Tash, supra note 50, at 19-20 (noting that in CSOB v.
Slovak, the ICSID determined that SWFs could qualify for their services, so long as they were not a foreign
states proper).
M See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10 (showing that the agreements are with Australia, Bahrain,
Canada, Chile, Oman and Singapore. Agreements with Columbia and South Korea are pending).
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applicable to other international bodies (such as pension funds). The
process has worked reasonably well when considering this alternative
group,253 and should function for SWFs as well.25
V. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
GATS is one of the most important regulations since it is legally
binding.255 There are roughly 153 World Trade Organization ("WTO")
members who are committed to GATS.256 Almost every SWF nation is a
member or observer to the WTO.257  Therefore, GATS touches nearly
every SWF member.
There are some initial threshold requirements to trigger the GATS
application. First, SWFs must transact with shares of a business that
performs services (including financial, transportation, or professional).258
Studies have found that nearly half of SWF transactions are in the
financial industry, while many others are in other approved service
industries.259
Second, the SWF must obtain control over the corporation.2" The
Monitor Group's Study showed that in over 25% of the transactions
SWFs do in fact take a majority position.' Third, GATS most likely only
applies to those SWFs that are agencies or instrumentalities of the
government, not the foreign state itself.262 This article has already argued
that most SWFs are in fact agencies or instrumentalities.263
Therefore, in a significant number of instances GATS will be
applicable. When GATS is applicable an aggrieved country can bring a
2 See, e.g., EDF Int. et. al. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23 (2008) (Park, Kaufman-Kohler, &
Remon, Arbs.).
2 See Peterson Study, supra note 39, at 5-6 (concluding that this process will adequately protect the
public's interests).
255 GATS, supra note 33, at 285 (denoting that members agree to this resolution). See also De Meester,
supra note 19, at 22.
256 De Meester, supra note 19, at 22.
2 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10 (demonstrating that, in fact, of all the nations with SWFs
Kiribati is the only country who is not a member or observer to the WTO).
M See GATS, supma note 33, at art I; see abo De Meester, supra note 19, at 22-23.
2 De Meester, supra note 19, at 9,23 (including energy, telecommunications and healthcare).
260 GATS, supra note 33, at art. XXVIll(m)(ii); see also De Meester, supra note 19, at 22-23 n.113
(dissecting GATS' language to mean "a commercial presence' by a juridical person of another Member' is a
juridical person that is 'owned or controlled by' (natural or legal) persons of that Member'").
261 Monitor Press Release, supra note 90.
6 See De Meester, supra note 19, at 23.
2 See supra notes 182-94 and accompanying text.
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case against a SWF to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel.2" This
provides another important avenue for nationalities to recover against
SWFs. To date, SWFs have not been involved in any WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel cases.265
A second international response is the IMF's Santiago Principles,
passed in 2008.2" The Santiago Principles includes twenty-four best
practices for SWFs, known as Generally Accepted Principles and Practices
("GAPP"). 267 These best practices can be broken into three categories of
recommendations. 2' The first category revolves around the legal
framework; the second are institutional and governance structures; and
the third are investment and risk measures.269
Three common criticisms have emerged regarding the Santiago
Principles. First, the Santiago Principles are voluntary and therefore may
not receive support.270 Second, some economists feel there has been an
overemphasis on disclosure and transparency, which ignores other
valuable signs of risk.271 And third, these principles are broad guidelines
with few directives on implementation.
To cure these problems an International Working Group of Sovereign
Wealth Funds ("IWG") was created.272 The IWG recently created the
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds ("Forum") to further this
264 De Meester, supra note 19, at 28.
26 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: The Disputes,
http/www.wto.org'engislitratopFdispue/find dispucasese.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) (for a
searchable database ofdisputed cases).
2' SANTIAGO PRINCIPUES, supra note 34.
267 Id. at 7-9.
2M Id; De Meester, supra note 19, at 19 (breaking the principles into three categories).
26 See generally SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 34; De Meester, supra note 19, at 19.
270 See Richard A Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulations of Soverign Weald Funds: The Virtues of
Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L REV. 111, 120-21 (2009). See also WEISS, supra note 4, at 20 (noting that most
influential SWFs are not borrowers from the IMF, and therefore not subject to IMF's conditions).
Z71 Soereign Walth Funds: Foreign Policy Consequence in an Era of New Money Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 110th Cong 2 (2008) (testimony of Douglas Rediker, Co-Director Global Strategic Finance
Initiative, The New America Foundation), available at
http;/www.newamenca.net/publications/policy/sovereignwealth funds foreignjpolicyconsequencesera-n
ewimoney.
2m Press Release, Int'l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, International Working Group of
Sovereign Wealth Funds Presents the "Santiago Principles" to the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (Oct. 11, 2008), httpl/ww.iwg-swforgfpr/swfpr0806.htm (comprising the IWG's membership
are Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Ireland, South
Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Trinidad &
Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States).
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purpose.273  The Forum will promote cooperation, adherence and
refinement to the Santiago Principles.274  Therefore, the IWG and the
Forum will encourage adoption of the principles and provide details on its
execution.
The Santiago Principles do not expressly speak on liability or recovery
issues. However, GAPP 15 states that SWF "operations and activities in
host countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable
regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they
operate." 275 This suggests that the IMF supports SWF accountability and
recovery for aggrieved investors. However, in its current state, the SWF
Santiago Principles do not provide a meaningful arena for private or
public recovery.
VI. CONCLUSION
There already exists a score of proposed solutions to the "SWF
problem." In large part, these proposals advance national responses. For
instance, some feel the CFIUS process should be depoliticized and voting
issues further clarified.276 The GAO believes each sector's agencies should
refine their execution tactics for governing applicable regulations.27 7 A
third proposal is to endorse and refine the Santiago Principles.278 And
lastly, some feel the United States should refine its BIT models to address
the situation.279
These are all well reasoned solutions, but to the wrong problem.
Again, this goes back to how the question is being phrased. For most, the
debate is whether SWFs are friend or foe. This will inherently direct
responses in one of two ways. First, regulations might become overly
accepting of SWF investments, or in other words, a race to the bottom.
273 Int'l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, "Kuwait Delaration": Establishment of the
Intemational Forum ofSoveign Wealth Funds, Apr. 6,2009, httpV/www.iwg-swf.org/mikwwaitdec.htm.
274 Id.
as SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at 8.
276 See Brendan Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Barbarians at the Gate? An Analysis of die Legl
and Business Implications oftheirAscendancy, 4 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 97,124 (2009).
m See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 21.
278 See Amy Keller, Sovemrgn Wealth Funds: Tstworhy Investors or Vehides of Strategic Ambition? An
Assessment ofthe Benefits, Risks and Possible Regulation ofSoereign Wealth Funds, 7 GEO.J.L& PUB. POLY 333, 357
(2009).
2 See David Hall, The False Panacea of International Agreements for U.S. Regulations of Sovemgn Wealth
Funds, 5 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REv. 137,165-66 (2008).
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This will encourage SWF investments at the expense of market security
and investor protection.
The second response is to restrict SWF activity. Indeed, the vast
majority of proposals are moving in this direction.2" This has caused
Gerard Lyons, Chief Economist and Head of Global Research at Standard
Chartered, to comment "[t]here is a need to take seriously the likelihood
of Western governments and SWFs being on a future collision course over
what they can buy, and where. A protectionist backlash against strategic
investments is very real and threatens global trade.""'
However, the results are drastically improved when the debate is
framed as: are there sufficient market protections? This shifts the concern
as to whether an appropriate market recourse exists, rather than focusing
on political implications. The aforementioned proposals all seek to add
new regulations or burdens for SWFs (or the minority who seek to
withdraw existing regulations). The market protection approach does not
seek to interfere with the market's ability to contract with SWFs; rather, it
simply examines the liabilities of a SWF when they violate those contracts.
This enables the proper amount of regulation, avoiding both the race to
the bottom and protectionist outcomes mentioned above.
When examining market protections, there are essentially three major
players to investigate. Two of these three are sufficiently protected, the
last is not. First, the public has a vast array of regulations and
international principles to lean on.2 8 Through these policies the public is
sufficiently protected. Likewise, private citizens who can contract at an
arms-length with SWFs can personally negotiate the issues of damages
and remedies.283
Unfortunately, the remaining group, private investors who cannot
contract at a arms-length, might be the largest group. Currently they are
largely unprotected, and therefore, some change is needed. The best
platform to do so is to amend the Immunities Act. First, for an investor to
recover anything he or she would need to traverse through the
Immunities Act.28 Second, the Immunities Act has a long history, thus
providing an element of predictability to the solution.285 Third, the
2 SeesupraPartIVA
281 Lyons, supra note 22, at 194.
282 Se supra Part IV.B.
M See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text
2' See supra Part 111.B.
2M See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2895 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The Act has been in place for over forty years.
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Immunities Act already governs recovery issues.28 And fourth, a stated
purpose of the Immunities Act is to provide relief to individual
287investors.
Currently, the Immunities Act ties recovery to property used in
connection with the issue.288 In the case of SWFs, which might not have a
lot of qualifying property to satisfy the judgment, the Immunities Act
should tie the amount of recovery to the amount of the investment in
dispute. The practice of tying liability to the size of the investment, as
opposed to collateral property (as is currently the case), is already in
practice in other areas of securities liability.289
Using the investment as the liability anchor prevents a SWF from
being open to limitless liability, since the SWF will only be responsible up
to the amount it voluntarily chooses to invest; while at the same time
giving investors meaningful property to attach. In addition, the United
States could include performance and cooperation incentives for SWFs to
limit their liability. For instance, voluntary disclosures or years of
investment in the United States could be employed to limit punitive
damages or other positive incentives. One thing is for certain, the United
States should address this issue before it arises because, by then, it might
be too late.
2 See 28 U.S.C. S 1609-1611 (1976).
M See H.R REP. No. 94-1487, at 7.
2 See id. (specifying that perhaps a private party's best chance is when the property for which the
claim is based upon is the same property attached to the judgment).
M9 See e.g., AE. Korpela & Ll. Reiser, SharehoIders' Suits Against Investment Companies, 30 ALR 3d
1088 (1970).
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EXHIBIT ONE
HIGH-PROFLE SWF INVESTMENTS IN 20072"





































2 Epstein & Rose, supra note 270, at 116 (quoting David Marchick, Songn Wbadt Funds and
National Sacurity 5 (Mar. 31, 2008), httpiAvww.oecd.orgfdasoecd38/12/40395077.pdf).
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EXHmr Two
PETERSON STUDY SCORESHEET291
Country Fund Name Structure Governance Transparency & Behavior Total
Accountability
New Zealand Superannuation 8.00 4.00 12.00 0.00 24.00
Fund
Norway Government 7.50 4.00 10.50 1.00 23.00
Pension Fund-
Global
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 8.00 2.00 11.75 0.00 21.75
United States CalPERS 8.00 3.00 10.25 0.50 21.75
- Benchmark
Canada Alberta Heritage 7.50 3.00 9.00 0.00 19.50
Savings Trust Fund
United States Alaska Permanent 7.50 2.00 8.50 0.00 18.00
Fund
Australia Future Fund 8.00 2.00 7.00 0.00 17.00
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund of the 5.00 2.00 9.50 0.00 16.50
Republic of
Azerbaijan
Chile Economic and Social 7.00 2.00 6.50 0.00 15.50
Stabilization Fund
Botswana Pula Fund 5.50 2.00 7.00 0.00 14.50
Kazakhstan National Oil Fund 6.00 2.00 6.50 0.00 14.50
Singapore Temasek Holdings 4.00 1.50 8.00 0.00 13.50
Sao Tome National Oil 8.00 2.00 2.25 0.00 12.25
and Principe Account
Trinidad and Heritage and 6.50 2.00 3.75 0.00 12.25
Tobago Stabilization Fund
Kuwait Kuwait Investment 6.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 12.00
Authority
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 4.00 1.50 4.00 0.00 9.50
Russia Stabilization Fund of 4.00 2.00 3.50 0.00 9.50
the Russian
Federation
Korea Korea Investment 6.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 9.00
9 Peterson Study, supra note 39, at 12
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Country Fund Name Structure Governance Transparency & Behavior Total
Accountability
Corporation
Kiribati Revenue 5.00 2.00 0.50 0.00 7.50
Equalization Reserve
Fund
Mexico Oil Income 5.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 7.00
Stabilization Fund
China Central Huijin 5.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 6.00
Investment
Company
Venezuela National 1.50 0.50 4.00 0.00 6.00
Development Fund
Iran Oil Stabilization 4.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 5.50
Fund
Venezuela Macroeconomic 3.00 0.50 2.00 0.00 5.50
Stabilization Fund
Oman State General 3.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 5.00
Reserve Fund
Sudan Oil Revenue 4.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 5.00
Stabilization Account
Algeria Revenue Regulation 3.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 4.50
Fund
United Arab Istithmar 3.00 0.50 0.25 0.00 3.75
Emirates
United Arab Mubadala 3.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 3.50
Emirates Development
Company
Brunei Brunei Investment 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.50
Agency




Qatar Qatar Investment 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
Authority
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Country Fund Name Structure Governance Transparency & Behavior Total
Accountability
Total 8.00 4.00 12.00 1.00 25.00
Possible
Points
Average 4.80 1.42 4.02 0.03 10.27
Number of
Points
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EXHIBIT THREE
SECTOR SPECIFIC LAWS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS 9 2
Laws that limit and regulate foreign investment or require approval
Transportation: Aviation and Maritime
* Foreign investment in U.S. air carriers is limited to 25% of
voting interest.
* Foreign investors may have up to one third of the directors in
U.S. air carriers.
* Foreign investment in U.S. flag coastwise trade vessels is
limited to 25% ownership or control.
* Foreign investors may own 100% of a U.S. flagged
international trade vessel so long as the vessel owner is
organized and incorporated under the laws of the U.S., its
chief executive office and chairman of the board are U.S.
citizens, and no more than a minority of the number of its
Board of Directors necessary to constitute a quorum are non-
U.S. citizens.
* Foreign investment in U.S. commercial fishing vessels is
limited to 25% ownership or control.
Conununications
* Foreign governments may not hold radio licenses.
* Foreign investment in corporations that hold broadcast,
common carrier (telecommunications services), and certain
other radio licenses is limited to 20%.
292 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 15-16.
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* Foreign investment in U.S. parent company of a company
that holds abovementioned licenses is generally limited to
25%.
* License to own or control a cable landing system, or
authorization to provide telecommunications service may be
withheld based on foreign ownership.
Banking
* Foreign banks must get FRB approval before establishing a
branch or agency, or acquiring ownership or control of a
commercial lending company, and any company (foreign or
domestic) must get FRB approval before acquiring 25% or
more or otherwise acquiring control of a U.S. bank.
* Banks must generally be subject to comprehensive
supervision on a consolidated basis by appropriate authorities
in home country.
Natural Resources and Energy: Nuclear Energy
* Entities that are known or are reasonably believed to be
owned, controlled, or dominated by foreign interests may not
hold a license for nuclear reactor facilities.
* Foreign ownership of nuclear production, utilization, and
enrichment facilities, as well as licensing for source material
and special nuclear material, must be evaluated for impact on
the common defense and security of the United States.
Natural Resources and Energy: Mining and Mineral Leases
* No foreign investor may directly purchase or own federal
mineral deposits that are open to exploration or other
important mineral leases.
* Foreign investors may, however, own up to 100% of a U.S.
company that holds mineral or mining leases.
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* No foreign investor may directly hold a license to construct or
operate a deepwater oil or natural gas port beyond State
seaward boundaries and beyond the territorial limits of the
United States.
Laws that restrict activities of foreign-owned
firms or investors after investment is made
Transportation: Aviation and Maritime
* Vessels that are more than 25% foreign owned cannot carry
cargo or passengers between U.S. ports.
* Aircraft that are more than 25% foreign owned cannot carry
passengers or cargo between two U.S. cities.
* Vessels that are more than 25% foreign owned are only
allowed to fish in U.S. fisheries under certain international
agreements and are subject to annual quotas.
Banking
* The activities a bank holding company can engage in are
limited. (This is not limited to foreign investors.)
Defense
* Non U.S. citizens and companies under foreign ownership,
control, or influence are generally not eligible for access to
classified information.
* Foreign government controlled, companies generally cannot
be awarded U.S. defense contracts, or Department of Energy
contracts, which require access to proscribed information
under a national security program, absent a waiver.
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Laws that do not restrict, but only
require disclosure, of foreign ownership
Agriculture
* Foreign investors in agricultural land holdings must file a
disclosure report.

